Occupational licensing policy affects close to 25% of workers in the United States. The social benefits and costs of licensing policy is a topic of much debate as it has implications for consumer welfare and labor market outcomes. Licensing policy protects consumers by alleviating an information asymmetry in the market of goods and services. However, it acts as a barrier to entry for workers into occupations that have licensing requirements. Fausto studies the effect of occupational licensing on welfare, the allocation of labor, and the wage premium between licensed and non-licensed workers. To study the trade-off generated by licensing policy, he develops a model with informational asymmetries in the product market and occupational choice in the labor market. Licensing costs are modeled as monetary fees and as training, which is costly for workers in terms of effort and time.  Fausto calibrates the model to match moments from the SIPP and ONET data. Carrying out counterfactual policy analysis, he finds that a licensing policy with no training induces lower ability workers to enter licensed occupations. As a result, consumer welfare falls by 13% since lower quality goods are produced. Furthermore, the wage premium falls by more than half as the average ability of workers falls in licensed occupations.