In the United States, employment and medical expenditure risk are tightly linked because of the prevalence of employer-provided health insurance. Kurt investigates the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of introducing a single-payer (universal) healthcare system using an incomplete asset markets model with labor market frictions and medical expenditure risk over the lifecycle, paying particular attention to the labor market effects of the reform. First, he compares the model-implied labor supply elasticities with respect to public health insurance generosity to existing empirical evidence. The model partially accounts for the puzzlingly wide range of estimates found in three microeconomic experiments conducted in Tennessee, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Next, he uses the model to understand the general equilibrium effects of the policy reform. He finds that it results in higher reservation wages, a corresponding reduction in firm vacancy creation, both of which lead to a quantitatively large decline in the job finding rate. The negative impact of the lower job finding rate outweighs insurance benefits of generous public health coverage, resulting in substantial welfare losses among low-wealth households for whom employment is most valuable.