

# Lecture Notes on Growth and Firm Heterogeneity

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## growth and firm heterogeneity

1. a model of blueprint capital accumulation based on my
    - “On the Mechanics of Firm Growth”
      - *Review of Economic Studies* (2011)
  2. a model of productivity growth based on my
    - “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms”
      - *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2007)
    - “Technology Diffusion and Growth”
      - *Journal of Economic Theory* (2012)
- ▶ for a survey see
- “Models of Growth and Firm Heterogeneity”
    - *Annual Review of Economics* (2010)
- ▶ on the potential multiplicity of stationary densities, see
- “Four Models of Knowledge Diffusion and Growth”
    - *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, w.p. 724* (2015)


## Zipf's Law

$$\Pr [N \geq n] = \frac{1}{n}$$


$$\sum_{n=1}^M n \Pr [N = n] = \sum_{n=1}^M \frac{n}{n(n+1)} = \sum_{n=1}^M \frac{1}{n+1} \sim \ln(M)$$

since  $\sum_{n=1}^M \frac{1}{n+1}$  behaves like  $\int_1^M \frac{dx}{x}$  for large  $M$


# right tail of the firm size distribution (BDS, 2015)



... cannot be literally Zipf (BDS, 2015)




some movement over time, but still quite stable




(updated from Luttmer [2010], *Annual Review of Economics*)

# public service announcement: BDS data does have issues



# large firms have many establishments (BDS, 2015)





## the simplest example

- deterministic growth, conditional on survival

$$p(a) = \delta e^{-\delta a}, \quad S(a) = e^{\gamma a}$$

this implies

$$\Pr [S(a) \geq s] = \Pr \left[ a \geq \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s) \right] = e^{-\delta \times \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s)} = s^{-\delta/\gamma}$$

- deterministic growth and population growth
  - size of entering cohort at time  $t$  is  $E_t = E e^{\eta t}$
  - relative size of age- $a$  cohort is  $\eta e^{-\eta a}$
  - adding up over all cohorts

$$\int_0^{\infty} \iota [e^{\gamma a} > s] \eta e^{-\eta a} da = e^{-\eta \times \frac{\ln(s)}{\gamma}} = s^{-\eta/\gamma}$$

## the Beta and Gamma functions

- the Gamma function, for  $x > 0$

$$\Gamma(x) = \int_0^{\infty} t^{x-1} e^{-t} dt$$

- implies a recursion

$$\Gamma(x+1) = \int_0^{\infty} u^x e^{-u} du = -u^x e^{-u} \Big|_0^{\infty} + x \int_0^{\infty} u^{x-1} e^{-u} du = x\Gamma(x).$$

– Clearly,  $\Gamma(1) = 1$  and hence  $\Gamma(n+1) = n!$  for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

- the Beta function for  $x > 0$  and  $y > 0$  is defined as

$$B(x, y) = \int_0^1 t^{x-1} (1-t)^{y-1} dt$$

- note that  $u = e^{-t}$  gives  $du = -e^{-t} dt = -u dt$  and thus

$$\int_0^1 u^{x-1} (1-u)^{y-1} du = \int_0^1 u^x (1-u)^{y-1} [u^{-1} du] = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-xt} (1-e^{-t})^{y-1} dt.$$

- can show

$$B(x, y) = \frac{\Gamma(x)\Gamma(y)}{\Gamma(x+y)}.$$

## Stirling's formula

- for large  $x$ ,

$$\Gamma(x) \approx \sqrt{2\pi} x^{x-\frac{1}{2}} e^{-x}$$

- hence

$$B(x, y) = \frac{\Gamma(x)\Gamma(y)}{\Gamma(x+y)} \sim \left(\frac{x}{x+y}\right)^x \frac{1}{(x+y)^y}$$

for large  $x$ . Now

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{x}{x+y}\right)^x = \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \left(1 - \frac{y}{x+y}\right)^x = e^{-y},$$

and so

$$B(x, y) \sim \frac{1}{x^y}$$

for large  $x$ .

- in other words,

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\Gamma(x)x^y}{\Gamma(x+y)} = 1$$

for any  $y > 0$ .

## a birth-death example

- existing projects beget new projects, randomly, at the rate  $\mu > 0$
- cohort distribution  $\{p_{n,t}\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ , starting from  $p_{1,0} = 1$ ,

$$Dp_{1,t} = -\mu p_{1,t},$$

and

$$Dp_{n,t} = \mu(n-1)p_{n-1,t} - \mu n p_{n,t}, \quad n-1 \in \mathbb{N}$$

- first

$$p_{1,t} = e^{-\mu t}$$

and then

$$D[e^{\mu n t} p_{n,t}] = e^{\mu n t} \mu(n-1)p_{n-1,t}, \quad n-1 \in \mathbb{N}$$

so that

$$p_{n,t} = \mu(n-1) \int_0^t e^{\mu n(s-t)} p_{n-1,s} ds, \quad n-1 \in \mathbb{N}.$$

- iterate to construct the geometric solution

$$p_{n,t} = e^{-\mu t} (1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-1}, \quad n \in \mathbb{N}$$

## verification

- for  $n - 1 \in \mathbb{N}$ , observe that

$$p_{n,t} = e^{-\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-1}$$

implies

$$\begin{aligned} Dp_{n,t} &= -\mu e^{-\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-1} + \mu(n - 1)e^{-2\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-2} \\ &= \mu(n - 1)e^{-\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-2} \\ &\quad + \mu(n - 1)(e^{-2\mu t} - e^{-\mu t})(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-2} - \mu e^{-\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-1} \\ &= \mu(n - 1)e^{-\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-2} - \mu n e^{-\mu t}(1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-1} \\ &= \mu(n - 1)p_{n-1,t} - \mu n p_{n,t} \end{aligned}$$

as required.

combine with random firm exit at rate  $\delta > 0$

- implied age distribution of firms has a density  $\delta e^{-\delta t}$
- the stationary size distribution is then given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 s_n &= \int_0^\infty \delta e^{-\delta t} p_{n,t} dt \\
 &= \int_0^\infty \delta e^{-\delta t} e^{-\mu t} (1 - e^{-\mu t})^{n-1} dt \\
 &= \frac{\delta}{\mu} \int_0^\infty e^{-(1+\delta/\mu)[\mu t]} (1 - e^{-[\mu t]})^{n-1} d[\mu t] \\
 &= \frac{\delta}{\mu} \int_0^\infty e^{-(1+\delta/\mu)s} (1 - e^{-s})^{n-1} ds = \frac{\delta \Gamma(n) \Gamma(1 + \delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(n + 1 + \delta/\mu)}
 \end{aligned}$$

- the right tail probabilities are

$$R_n = \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} s_k = \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} \frac{\delta \Gamma(k) \Gamma(1 + \delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(k + 1 + \delta/\mu)} = \frac{\delta \Gamma(n) \Gamma(\delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(n + \delta/\mu)}.$$

for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

doing the sum

- the claim is that

$$R_n = \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} \frac{\delta \Gamma(k) \Gamma(1 + \delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(k + 1 + \delta/\mu)} = \frac{\delta \Gamma(n) \Gamma(\delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(n + \delta/\mu)}.$$

- ▶ the summation follows from

$$\frac{\Gamma(n) \Gamma(x)}{\Gamma(n+x)} - \frac{\Gamma(n+1) \Gamma(x)}{\Gamma(n+1+x)} = \left(1 - \frac{n}{n+x}\right) \frac{\Gamma(n) \Gamma(x)}{\Gamma(n+x)} = \frac{\Gamma(n) \Gamma(1+x)}{\Gamma(n+1+x)}$$

## the mean

- finite if  $\delta > \mu$

– summation by parts implies

$$\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} n s_n = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} R_n = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{\delta \Gamma(n) \Gamma(\delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(n + \delta/\mu)} = \frac{\delta \Gamma(\delta/\mu - 1)}{\mu \Gamma(\delta/\mu)} = \frac{1}{1 - \mu/\delta}.$$

– to verify: consider  $\sum_{k=n}^{\infty} R_k$  and use the same result as for  $R_n$  itself.

- infinite if  $\delta \leq \mu$

– may be fine if there is a finite number of firms

– problematic in models with a continuum of firms

- key

– cannot have  $\mu$  exogenous if  $n$  is employment

– firms cannot grow at just any rate—workers come from somewhere

– must respect labor market clearing



## the tail index, Zipf's law

- Stirling's approximation, for  $x$  large

$$\Gamma(x) \sim \sqrt{2\pi} x^{x-\frac{1}{2}} e^{-x}$$

- hence

$$R_n = \frac{\delta \Gamma(n) \Gamma(\delta/\mu)}{\mu \Gamma(n + \delta/\mu)} \sim n^{-\delta/\mu}.$$

So  $\ln(R_n)$  behaves like  $-(\delta/\mu) \ln(n)$ , and the slope is greater than 1 in absolute value if we assume  $\mu < \delta$  to ensure a finite mean. In US data,  $\delta/\mu$  appears to be about 1.05.

- note that  $\mu \uparrow \delta$  gives

$$s_n = \frac{\Gamma(n)\Gamma(2)}{\Gamma(n+2)} = \frac{1}{n(n+1)}$$

and thus

$$R_n = \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} s_k = \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} \frac{1}{k(k+1)} = \frac{1}{n}$$

since  $(1/n) - 1/(1+n) = 1/[n(n+1)]$ . This is Zipf's law.

## alternative derivation

- a unit measure of firms

- exit at the rate  $\delta$
- replaced by a new entrant with  $n = 1$

- hence

$$0 = -(\delta + \mu)s_1 + \delta$$

and

$$0 = \mu(n - 1)s_{n-1} - (\delta + \mu n)s_n, \quad n - 1 \in \mathbb{N}.$$

- this yields

$$s_n = \frac{\mu(n - 1)}{\delta + \mu n} \times s_{n-1}, \quad n - 1 \in \mathbb{N}.$$

- combined with  $s_1 = \delta/(\delta + \mu)$  this yields

$$s_{n+1} = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \mu} \prod_{k=1}^n \frac{\mu k}{\delta + \mu(k + 1)} = \frac{\delta \Gamma(n + 1) \Gamma\left(\frac{\mu + \delta}{\mu}\right)}{\mu \Gamma\left(n + 1 + \frac{\mu + \delta}{\mu}\right)}$$

which holds for all  $n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$ .

## model 1

the homogeneous blueprints model in

Luttmer [*Review of Economic Studies*, 2011]

## dynastic households

- ▶ preferences

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} H_t \ln(c_t) dt,$$

household consumption is

$$C_t = H_t c_t$$

$$H_t = H e^{\eta t}, \quad \rho > \eta > 0$$

- ▶  $c_t$  is a CES composite good of differentiated commodities

$$c_t = \left[ \int_0^{N_t} c_{\omega,t}^{1-1/\varepsilon} d\omega \right]^{1/(1-1/\varepsilon)}$$

where  $\varepsilon > 1$

## household choices

- ▶ the dynastic present-value budget constraint

$$\int_0^{\infty} \exp\left(-\int_0^t r_s ds\right) H_t c_t dt \leq \text{wealth}$$

implies the first-order condition

$$e^{-\rho t} H_t \times \frac{1}{c_t} = \lambda \exp\left(-\int_0^t r_s ds\right) H_t$$

or simply

$$\frac{e^{-\rho t}}{c_t} = \lambda \pi_t$$

- ▶ differentiating yields the Euler condition

$$r_t = \rho + \frac{Dc_t}{c_t}$$

## household choices

the differentiated commodity demands are

$$c_{\omega,t} = \left( \frac{p_{\omega,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} H_t c_t$$

where  $P_t$  is the price index

$$P_t = \left( \int_0^{N_t} p_{\omega,t}^{1-\varepsilon} d\omega \right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)}$$

## producers

- blueprint + linear labor-only technology yields output  $y_{\omega,t} = z l_{\omega,t}$
- the time- $t$  wage in units of the composite consumption good =  $w_t$
- to maximize  $P_t v_{\omega,t} = (p_{\omega,t} - P_t w_t / z) c_{\omega,t}$  subject to  $c_{\omega,t} = (p_{\omega,t} / P_t)^{-\varepsilon} H_t c_t$  set

$$\frac{p_{\omega,t}}{P_t} = \frac{w_t / z}{1 - 1/\varepsilon}$$

- eliminating  $p_{\omega,t} / P_t$  from the price index gives

$$w_t = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right) z N_t^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

- ▶ implied employment and profits per blueprint

$$\begin{bmatrix} w_t l_{\omega,t} \\ v_{\omega,t} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} w_t l_t \\ v_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - 1/\varepsilon \\ 1/\varepsilon \end{bmatrix} \frac{H_t c_t}{N_t}$$

- ▶ in particular

$$\frac{v_t}{w_t} = \frac{l_t}{\varepsilon - 1}$$

## entrants and incumbents

- ▶ two technologies for developing new blueprints
  - skilled entrepreneurial time only
    - new blueprints from scratch
  - existing blueprints and labor
    - new blueprint codes for distinct differentiated commodity
- ▶ firm = collection of blueprints derived from the same initial blueprint
  - no reason to trade blueprints—any positive cost forces no trade



## costly blueprint replication

- recall that profits per blueprint are

$$v_t = \frac{w_t l_t}{\varepsilon - 1}$$

- the price of a blueprint in units of consumption is  $q_t$
- a flow of  $m_t$  units of labor can be used to replicate an existing blueprint randomly at the rate  $g(m_t)$

► therefore

$$r_t q_t = \max_m \left\{ w_t \left( \frac{l_t}{\varepsilon - 1} - m \right) + q_t g(m) + Dq_t \right\}$$

► the first-order condition for replication is

$$1 = \frac{q_t}{w_t} \times Dg(m_t)$$

## a Roy model of primary factor supplies

► talent distribution  $T \in \Delta(\mathbb{R}_{++}^2)$

per capita supply of entrepreneurial services

$$E\left(\frac{q}{w}\right) = \int_{qx > wy} x dT(x, y)$$

per capita supply of labor

$$L\left(\frac{q}{w}\right) = \int_{wy > qx} y dT(x, y)$$

## aggregate blueprint accumulation

the number of blueprints evolves according to

$$DN_t = g(m_t)N_t + H_t E \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right)$$

- $N_0 > 0$  is a given initial value
- this will be non-stationary

► in per-capita terms

$$D \left( \frac{N_t}{H_t} \right) = -(\eta - g(m_t)) \times \frac{N_t}{H_t} + E \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right)$$

- a steady state requires

$$\eta > g(m)$$

- this will be an equilibrium outcome
- but individual firm histories are non-stationary

## the number of firms

- blueprints, not firms, matter for aggregate dynamics
  - but very relevant for observables

► entrepreneurs set up new firms

$$DM_t = H_t E \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right)$$

- per capita

$$D \left( \frac{M_t}{H_t} \right) = -\eta \times \frac{M_t}{H_t} + E \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right)$$

► in the steady state

$$\frac{M_t}{H_t} = \frac{1}{\eta} E \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right)$$

## the dynamic equilibrium


- use the  $N_t/H_t$  as the state, with  $q_t/c_t$  as the co-state
  - the marginal utility weighted price  $q_t/c_t$  removes  $r_t$  from the system
- the differential equation is

$$D \left( \frac{N_t}{H_t} \right) = -(\eta - g(m_t)) \times \frac{N_t}{H_t} + E \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right)$$
$$D \left( \frac{q_t}{c_t} \right) = (\rho - (g(m_t) - Dg(m_t)m_t)) \times \frac{q_t}{c_t} - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \frac{1}{N_t/H_t}$$

where

$$1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} = \frac{w_t}{c_t} \times l_t \times \frac{N_t}{H_t}$$
$$1 = \frac{q_t}{w_t} \times Dg(m_t)$$
$$L \left( \frac{q_t}{w_t} \right) = (l_t + m_t) \times \frac{N_t}{H_t}$$

# the phase diagram



## balanced growth

- ▶ the per capita number of blueprints is constant

$$N_t = N e^{\eta t}$$

- ▶ wages are

$$w_t = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right) z N_t^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

- ▶ implied growth from variety

$$\kappa = \frac{Dw_t}{w_t} = \frac{\eta}{\varepsilon - 1}$$

- ▶ familiar implications

- integrating the world improves welfare, a level effect
- persistent growth from variety depends on population growth

## steady state equilibrium for $s = q/w$

let  $m[s]$  and  $l[s]$  solve

$$\frac{1}{Dg(m)} = s = \frac{1}{\rho - g(m)} \left( \frac{l}{\varepsilon - 1} - m \right)$$

► steady state demand for blueprints

$$\frac{N}{H} = \frac{L(s)}{l[s] + m[s]}$$


► steady state supply of blueprints

$$\frac{N}{H} = \frac{E(s)}{\eta - g(m[s])}$$

- notice that this has an asymptote as  $g(m[s]) \uparrow \eta$
- now clear the market
- the assumption  $\rho > \eta$  implies that  $\eta > g(m)$  guarantees  $\rho > g(m)$



# equilibrium



what if the skill distribution is degenerate at  $(x, y)$ ?

► demand for blueprints

$$\frac{N}{H} = \frac{(1-a)y}{l[s] + m[s]}.$$

► supply of blueprints

$$\frac{N}{H} (\eta - g(m[s])) = ax$$

and

$$sx \leq y, \text{ w.e. if } a > 0.$$

where  $a$  = fraction of entrepreneurs.

► can have an equilibrium with  $a = 0$  and  $\eta = g(m[s])$

- but then the size distribution of firms fans out forever

## the Zipf limit

- a fraction  $1 - 1/\Lambda \in (0, 1)$  of the population can only supply labor,

$$L_\Lambda(s) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\Lambda}\right) \ell + \frac{\mathcal{L}(s)}{\Lambda}, \quad E_\Lambda(s) = \frac{\mathcal{E}(s)}{\Lambda}$$

- ▶ demand for blueprints

$$\frac{N}{H} = \frac{1}{l[s] + m[s]} \left( \left(1 - \frac{1}{\Lambda}\right) \ell + \frac{\mathcal{L}(s)}{\Lambda} \right)$$

- ▶ supply of blueprints

$$\frac{N}{H} = \frac{1}{\eta - g(m[s])} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s)}{\Lambda}$$

where  $l[s]$  and  $m[s]$  solve

$$\frac{1}{Dg(m)} = s = \frac{1}{\rho - g(m)} \left( \frac{l}{\varepsilon - 1} - m \right)$$

## the Zipf limit

- the steady state  $(m_\Lambda, l_\Lambda, s_\Lambda)$  solves

$$1 = sDg(m), \quad s = \frac{1}{\rho - g(m)} \left( \frac{l}{\varepsilon - 1} - m \right)$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}(s)}{(\eta - g(m))\Lambda} = \frac{1}{l + m} \left( \left(1 - \frac{1}{\Lambda}\right) \ell + \frac{1}{\Lambda} \times \mathcal{L}(s) \right)$$

- construct the  $\Lambda \rightarrow \infty$  limit

$$\eta = g(m_\infty)$$

$$1 = s_\infty Dg(m_\infty), \quad s_\infty = \frac{1}{\rho - \eta} \left( \frac{l_\infty}{\varepsilon - 1} - m_\infty \right)$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\infty)}{\lim_{\Lambda \rightarrow \infty} (\eta - g(m_\Lambda))\Lambda} = \frac{\ell}{l_\infty + m_\infty}$$

and

$$\frac{N_\infty}{H} = \frac{\ell}{l_\infty + m_\infty}$$

## the Zipf limit

- employment per blueprint

$$\left( \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\Lambda} \right) \ell + \frac{\mathcal{L}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda} \right) \frac{H_t}{N_t} = l[s_\Lambda] + m[s_\Lambda] \rightarrow l_\infty + m_\infty$$

- number of firms per capita

$$\frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda} \rightarrow 0$$

- number of blueprints per firm

$$\frac{\frac{1}{\eta - g(m_\Lambda)} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}}{\frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{g(m_\Lambda)}{\eta}} \rightarrow \infty$$

- employment per firm

$$\frac{\left( 1 - \frac{1}{\Lambda} \right) \ell + \frac{\mathcal{L}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}}{\frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}} \rightarrow \frac{\ell}{0} = \infty$$

## the Zipf limit

- the entry rate

$$\frac{\frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}}{\frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}} = \eta$$


- contribution of entry flow to employment

$$\frac{(l_\Lambda + m_\Lambda) \times \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}}{\left(1 - \frac{1}{\Lambda}\right) \ell + \frac{\mathcal{L}(s)}{\Lambda}} \rightarrow \frac{(l_\infty + m_\infty) \times \lim_{\Lambda \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathcal{E}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}}{\ell + \lim_{\Lambda \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathcal{L}(s_\Lambda)}{\Lambda}} = \frac{(l_\infty + m_\infty) \times 0}{\ell + 0} = 0$$


► to summarize

- robust entry
- average firm size explodes
- contribution of entrants to employment growth negligible

increasing  $\Lambda$




$z = \text{tail index}$   
 $\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{z}} = \text{number of blueprints per firm}$





some firms grow much faster than  $g(m) < \eta = 0.01$



- and large firms are much younger than implied by this model
  - fix: two-type model with transitory rapid growth in Luttmer [2011]

## transitory growth

- suppose

$$[N_t, E_t] = [N, E] e^{\eta t}, \quad p(b) = \delta e^{-\delta b}, \quad S(a, b) = e^{\gamma \min\{a, b\}}$$

- fix some age cohort,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr [S_a \geq s] &= \Pr \left[ e^{\gamma \min\{a, b\}} \geq s \right] \\ &= \Pr \left[ \min\{a, b\} \geq \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s) \right] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a < \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s) \\ e^{-\delta \times \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s)} & \text{if } a \geq \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s) \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

or

$$\Pr [S_a \geq s] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a < \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s) \\ s^{-\delta/\gamma} & \text{if } a \geq \frac{1}{\gamma} \times \ln(s) \end{cases}$$

- adding up over all cohorts

$$\int_0^\infty \eta e^{-\eta a} \Pr [S_a \geq s] da = \int_{\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln(s)}^\infty \eta e^{-\eta a} s^{-\delta/\gamma} da = s^{-\delta/\gamma} \times e^{-\eta \times \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln(s)} = s^{-(\delta+\eta)/\gamma}$$

► now we can have  $\gamma$  much larger than  $\eta$

## outside the steady state

- see the phase diagram—one aggregate state variable
- ▶ far below the steady state
  - $q/w$  is very high
  - Roy model implies that “everyone” is an entrepreneur
- ▶ near the steady state
  - slow convergence when the firm size distribution is close to Zipf
- see my
  - “Slow Convergence in Economies with Organization Capital”
  - *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis w.p. 748, 2018*
  - and further references therein

## model 2

based on

Luttmer [*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2007]

and

Luttmer [*Journal of Economic Theory*, 2012]

**a crash course on the KFE for  $dy_t = \mu dt + \sigma dB_t$**

- without noise,  $f(t, y) = f(0, y - \mu t)$  implies

$$D_t f(t, y) = -\mu D_y f(0, y - \mu t) = -\mu D_y f(t, y)$$

- without drift, random increments make population move downhill

– CDF satisfies

$$D_t F(t, y) = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 D_y f(t, y)$$

– differentiate

$$D_t f(t, y) = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 D_{yy} f(t, y)$$

- ▶ combine and add random death at rate  $\delta$

$$D_t f(t, y) = -\mu D_y f(t, y) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 D_{yy} f(t, y) - \delta f(t, y)$$

- real justification: take limit in binomial tree

## the effect of exit at $b$

- number of firms

$$M_t = \int_b^\infty f(t, y) dy$$

- boundary conditions

$$f(t, b) = 0, \quad \lim_{y \rightarrow \infty} [ f(t, y), D_y f(t, y), D_{yy} f(t, y) ] = 0$$

- this yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \int_b^\infty f(t, y) dy &= \int_b^\infty D_t f(t, y) dy \\ &= -\mu \int_b^\infty D_y f(t, y) dy + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \int_b^\infty D_{yy} f(t, y) dy - \delta \int_b^\infty f(t, y) dy \\ &= -f(t, y) \Big|_b^\infty - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 D_y f(t, b) - \delta \int_b^\infty f(t, y) dy \end{aligned}$$

- therefore

$$DM_t = -\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 D_y f(t, b) - \delta M_t$$

- a steep density at the exit thresholds implies a lot of exit

## entry and exit

► flow of entrants

$$E_t = Ee^{\eta t}$$

– entry at  $y_0 = x$ , and then

$$dy_a = \mu da + \sigma dB_a$$

– exit when  $y_a$  hits  $b < x$

► density of firms

$$m(t, y) = M_t f(t, y)$$

where

$$M_t = \int_b^{\infty} m(t, y) dy$$

• conjecture that there is a stationary density

$$M_t = Me^{\eta t}, \quad f(t, y) = f(y)$$

– which implies  $D_t m(t, y) = \eta M_t f(y)$  and

$$\left[ D_y m(t, y) \quad D_{yy} m(t, y) \right] = M_t \left[ Df(y) \quad D^2 f(y) \right]$$

## entry and exit

- the KFE simplifies to

$$\eta f(y) = -\mu Df(y) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 D^2 f(y), \quad y \in (b, x) \cup (x, \infty)$$

– boundary conditions

$$f(b) = 0, \quad \lim_{x \uparrow y} f(x) = \lim_{x \downarrow y} f(x), \quad \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} f(x) = 0$$

- try solutions of the form  $e^{-\alpha y}$
- this implies a quadratic characteristic equation

$$\eta = \mu\alpha + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2\alpha^2 \Rightarrow \alpha_{\pm} = -\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \pm \sqrt{\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

- ▶ the solution for  $f(y)$  is a linear combination of  $e^{-\alpha_+ y}$  and  $e^{-\alpha_- y}$ 
  - one for each of the two domains  $(b, x)$  and  $(x, \infty)$
  - the boundary conditions pin down these linear combinations



## the solution

► the density is

$$f(y) = \frac{\alpha e^{-\alpha(y-b)}}{(e^{\alpha_*(x-b)} - 1)/\alpha_*} \times \min \left\{ \frac{e^{(\alpha+\alpha_*)(y-b)} - 1}{\alpha + \alpha_*}, \frac{e^{(\alpha+\alpha_*)(x-b)} - 1}{\alpha + \alpha_*} \right\},$$

where


$$\alpha = -\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma^2/2}}, \quad \alpha_* = \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

► note that the right tail behaves like  $e^{-\alpha y}$

► the implied entry rate  $\epsilon = E_t/M_t$  is

$$\epsilon = \eta + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 Df(b) = \eta + \frac{1}{2}\alpha\sigma^2 \left( \frac{e^{\alpha_*(x-b)} - 1}{\alpha_*} \right)^{-1}$$

# the stationary density



## an economy with differentiated commodities

- preferences

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} H_t \ln(c_t) dt$$

household consumption is

$$C_t = H_t c_t$$

$$H_t = H e^{\eta t}, \quad \rho > \eta > 0$$

- $c_t$  is a CES composite good of differentiated commodities

$$c_t = \left[ \int c_{\omega,t}^{1-1/\varepsilon} dM_t(\omega) \right]^{1/(1-1/\varepsilon)}$$

where  $\varepsilon > 1$

## household choices (dynamic)

- ▶ the dynastic present-value budget constraint

$$\int_0^{\infty} \exp\left(-\int_0^t r_s ds\right) H_t c_t dt \leq \text{wealth}$$

implies the first-order condition

$$e^{-\rho t} H_t \times \frac{1}{c_t} = \lambda \exp\left(-\int_0^t r_s ds\right) H_t$$

or simply

$$\frac{e^{-\rho t}}{c_t} = \lambda \pi_t$$

- ▶ differentiating yields the Euler condition

$$r_t = \rho + \frac{Dc_t}{c_t}$$

## household choices (static)

- ▶ the differentiated commodity demands are

$$c_{\omega,t} = \left( \frac{p_{\omega,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} H_t c_t$$

where  $P_t$  is the price index

$$P_t = \left( \int p_{\omega,t}^{1-\varepsilon} dM_t(\omega) \right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)}$$

## producers

- blueprint + linear labor-only technology yields output  $y_{\omega,t} = e^{z_{\omega,t}} l_{\omega,t}$
- the time- $t$  wage in units of the composite consumption good =  $w_t$
- ▶  $\max P_t v_{\omega,t} = (p_{\omega,t} - P_t w_t e^{-z_{\omega,t}}) y_{\omega,t}$  s.t.  $y_{\omega,t} = (p_{\omega,t}/P_t)^{-\varepsilon} H_t c_t$  gives

$$\frac{p_{\omega,t}}{P_t} = \frac{w_t e^{-z_{\omega,t}}}{1 - 1/\varepsilon}$$

- ▶ eliminating  $p_{\omega,t}/P_t$  from the price index gives

$$w_t = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right) e^{Z_t}, \quad e^{Z_t} = \left(\int e^{(\varepsilon-1)z_{\omega,t}} dM_t(\omega)\right)^{1/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

- ▶ implied employment and profits

$$\begin{bmatrix} w_t l_{\omega,t} \\ v_{\omega,t} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - 1/\varepsilon \\ 1/\varepsilon \end{bmatrix} e^{(\varepsilon-1)(z_{\omega,t} - Z_t)} H_t c_t$$

- also: a firm continuation cost of  $\phi > 0$  units of labor

## aggregate variable labor and consumption

- define

$$L_t = \int l_{\omega,t} dM_t(\omega)$$

- ▶ the CES aggregator applied to  $y_{\omega,t} = e^{z_{\omega,t}} l_{\omega,t}$  gives

$$H_t c_t = e^{Z_t} L_t \quad (1)$$

where

$$e^{Z_t} = \left( \int e^{(\varepsilon-1)z_{\omega,t}} dM_t(\omega) \right)^{1/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

- recall

$$w_t = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right) e^{Z_t} \quad (2)$$

- ▶ from (1) and (2)

$$w_t L_t = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right) H_t c_t$$

as expected.

## incumbent productivity processes

- log productivity of firm  $\omega$

$$dz_{\omega,t} = \theta_z dt + \sigma_z dW_{\omega,t}$$

- recall that variable profits are

$$\frac{v_{\omega,t}}{c_t} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \times e^{(\varepsilon-1)(z_{\omega,t}-Z_t)} H_t, \quad c_t = \frac{e^{Z_t} L_t}{H_t},$$

where

$$e^{Z_t} = \left( \frac{\int e^{(\varepsilon-1)z_{\omega,t}} dM_t(\omega)}{\int dM_t(\omega)} \right)^{1/(\varepsilon-1)} \times \left( \int dM_t(\omega) \right)^{1/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

- conjecture that there will (somehow) be a steady state of the form

$$[e^{Z_t}, w_t, c_t] = [e^Z, w, c] e^{\kappa t}, \quad \kappa = \theta + \frac{\eta}{\varepsilon - 1}$$

for some  $\theta$  to be determined

- this  $\theta$  will generally differ from  $\theta_z$
- the key assumption will be about the productivity of entrants



## marginal utility weighted profits

- recall that

$$\frac{v_{\omega,t}}{c_t} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \times e^{(\varepsilon-1)(z_{\omega,t}-Z_t)} H_t$$

with, in a steady state

$$dz_{\omega,t} = \theta_z dt + \sigma_z dW_{\omega,t}, \quad dZ_t = \kappa dt = \left( \theta + \frac{\eta}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) dt$$

- Ito's lemma implies

$$d \ln \left( \frac{v_{\omega,t}}{c_t} \right) = \mu dt + \sigma dW_{\omega,t}$$

where

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mu \\ \sigma \end{bmatrix} = (\varepsilon - 1) \begin{bmatrix} \theta_z - \theta \\ \sigma_z \end{bmatrix}$$

– the calculation is

$$\begin{aligned} (\varepsilon - 1)(\theta_z - \kappa) + \eta &= (\varepsilon - 1) \left( \theta_z - \left( \theta + \frac{\eta}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) \right) + \eta \\ &= (\varepsilon - 1) (\theta_z - \theta) \end{aligned}$$

## the value of a firm

- the marginal utility weighted price of a firm

$$\tilde{V}_t = \frac{1}{c_t} \times \max_{\tau} E_t \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} \exp \left( - \int_t^s r_u du \right) (v_{\omega,s} - \phi w_s) ds \right]$$

- recall, from logarithmic utility

$$\exp \left( - \int_t^s r_u du \right) = e^{-\rho t} \times \frac{c_t}{c_s}$$

- therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}_t &= \max_{\tau} E_t \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} \exp \left( - \int_t^s r_u du \right) \frac{c_s}{c_t} \left( \frac{v_{\omega,s}}{c_s} - \frac{\phi w_s}{c_s} \right) ds \right] \\ &= \max_{\tau} E_t \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} e^{-\rho s} \left( \frac{v_{\omega,s}}{c_s} - \frac{\phi w_s}{c_s} \right) ds \right] \end{aligned}$$

## a convenient state variable

- in units of fixed cost labor

$$V_t = \frac{\tilde{V}_t}{\phi w_t / c_t} = \max_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} e^{-\rho s} \times \frac{w_s / c_s}{w_t / c_t} \times \left( \frac{v_{\omega, s}}{\phi w_s} - 1 \right) ds \right]$$

- in a steady state

$$\frac{w_t}{c_t} = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \right) \frac{H_t}{L_t} \text{ will be constant}$$

and then

$$V_t = \max_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} e^{-\rho s} \left( \frac{v_{\omega, s}}{\phi w_s} - 1 \right) ds \right]$$

- define

$$e^{y_t} = \frac{v_{\omega, t}}{\phi w_t}$$

– in a steady state,

$$dy_t = \mu dt + \sigma dW_t$$

## the Bellman equation

- given some exit threshold  $b$ , the Bellman equation is then

$$\rho V(y) = e^y - 1 + \mu DV(y) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 D^2V(y), \quad y > b$$

– and the boundary conditions are

$$0 = V(b) \quad \lim_{y \rightarrow \infty} V(y) = \frac{e^y}{\rho - (\mu + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)}$$

- the optimal  $b$  must be such that

$$0 = DV(b).$$

- the solution is

$$V(y) = \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{\xi}{1 + \xi} \left( e^{y-b} - 1 - \frac{1 - e^{-\xi(y-b)}}{\xi} \right)$$

where

$$e^b = \frac{\xi}{1 + \xi} \left( 1 - \frac{\mu + \sigma^2/2}{\rho} \right), \quad \xi = \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \right)^2 + \frac{\rho}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

## entry

- let  $z_{X,t}$  the log productivity of exiting firms
- suppose entrants can use

$$z_{E,t} = z_{X,t} + \frac{\Delta}{\varepsilon - 1}$$

– standing on the shoulders of midgets...

- translates into entry state

$$e^{x_t} = e^{\Delta} \times \left( \frac{v_{\omega,t}}{\phi w_t} \right)_{\text{exiting firms}}$$

in a steady state

$$x = b + \Delta$$

- price of a new firm in units of fixed cost labor

$$s = V(x)$$

- as before, a Roy model delivers
  - a flow of entrants  $E(s)$
  - labor supply  $L(s)$

## variable labor as a function of the state

- the derived firm state variables are

$$e^{y_{\omega,t}} = \frac{v_{\omega,t}}{\phi w_t}$$

- depends on the individual productivities  $z_{\omega,t}$
- and on the aggregate state

- recall

$$\frac{v_{\omega,t}}{w_t l_{\omega,t}} = \frac{1/\varepsilon}{1 - 1/\varepsilon}$$

- ▶ so variable labor is

$$l_{\omega,t} = (\varepsilon - 1)\phi \times e^{y_{\omega,t}}$$

## the balanced growth path

- the number of firms is  $M_t = M e^{\eta t}$

► the steady state market clearing conditions are

1. the market for labor

$$L(s)H = \left( 1 + (\varepsilon - 1) \int_b^\infty e^y f(y) dy \right) \phi M$$

2. the market for entrepreneurial services

$$E(s)H = \left( \eta + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 Df(b) \right) M$$

►  $b$  is the optimal exit threshold

►  $f(\cdot)$  is the stationary density on  $(b, \infty)$

– both functions only of the firm growth rate  $\mu = (\varepsilon - 1)(\theta_z - \theta)$

## summary of balanced growth conditions

► demand for firms

$$\frac{M}{H} = \frac{1}{\phi} \frac{L(s)}{1 + (\varepsilon - 1) \int_b^\infty e^y f(y) dy}$$

► supply of firms

$$\frac{M}{H} = \frac{E(s)}{\eta + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 Df(b)}$$

where

$$s = V(b + \Delta),$$

and we have a mapping

$$\mu \mapsto (b, V(\cdot), f(\cdot))$$

• the growth rate is

$$\kappa = \theta + \frac{\eta}{\varepsilon - 1},$$

where

$$\theta = \theta_z - \frac{\mu}{\varepsilon - 1}$$

is the growth rate of entrant productivities



the mapping  $\mu \mapsto (b, V(\cdot), f(\cdot))$

- the value function is

$$V(y) = \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{\xi}{1 + \xi} \left( e^{y-b} - 1 - \frac{1 - e^{-\xi(y-b)}}{\xi} \right)$$

and

$$e^b = \frac{\xi}{1 + \xi} \left( 1 - \frac{\mu + \sigma^2/2}{\rho} \right), \quad \xi = \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \right)^2 + \frac{\rho}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

- the stationary density is

$$f(y) = \frac{\alpha e^{-\alpha(y-b)}}{(e^{\alpha_* \Delta} - 1)/\alpha_*} \times \min \left\{ \frac{e^{(\alpha+\alpha_*)(y-b)} - 1}{\alpha + \alpha_*}, \frac{e^{(\alpha+\alpha_*)\Delta} - 1}{\alpha + \alpha_*} \right\}$$

and

$$\alpha = -\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \right)^2 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma^2/2}}, \quad \alpha_* = \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \right)^2 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

## key properties of the mapping $\mu \mapsto (b, V(\cdot), f(\cdot))$

- recall that  $\mu = (\varepsilon - 1)(\theta_z - \theta)$

- ▶ the mean

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \mu} \int_b^\infty e^y f(y) dy > 0$$

– importantly,

$$\mu + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \uparrow \eta \text{ implies } \int_b^\infty e^y f(y) dy \rightarrow \infty$$

- ▶ the exit rate

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \mu} \left( \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 Df(b) \right) < 0$$

- ▶ the value of an entrant

$$\frac{\partial s}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\partial V(b + \Delta)}{\partial \mu} > 0$$

- ▶ the tail index

$$\frac{\partial \alpha}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \mu} \left( -\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma^2/2}} \right) < 0$$

## demand and supply curves have the usual slopes

- rapid firm growth increases the value of entrants

$$\frac{\partial s}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\partial V(b + \Delta)}{\partial \mu} > 0$$

### ► demand



$$\frac{M}{H} = \frac{1}{\phi} \frac{L(s)}{1 + (\varepsilon - 1) \int_b^\infty e^y f(y) dy} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial s} \left( \frac{M}{H} \right) < 0$$

– converges to zero as  $\mu + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \uparrow \eta$

### ► supply

$$\frac{M}{H} = \frac{E(s)}{\eta + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 Df(b)} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial s} \left( \frac{M}{H} \right) > 0$$

# market clearing and the tail index $\alpha$



## the Zipf asymptote

- demand and supply for firms

$$\frac{M}{H} = \frac{1}{\phi} \frac{L(s)}{1 + (\varepsilon - 1) \int_b^\infty e^y f(y) dy}$$
$$\frac{M}{H} = \frac{E(s)}{\eta + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 Df(b)}$$

where  $s = V(b + \Delta)$

- average firm size explodes as  $s$  increases and  $\mu + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \uparrow \eta$
  - hence, the demand for firms goes to zero
- to approach Zipf
    - shift the supply curve in along the downward sloping demand curve
    - can use shifts in  $E(\cdot)$  and  $L(\cdot)$  (from the Roy model)

## so what determines growth?

► recall

$$e^{Z_t} = \left( \frac{\int e^{(\varepsilon-1)z_{\omega,t}} dM_t(\omega)}{\int dM_t(\omega)} \right)^{1/(\varepsilon-1)} \times \left( \int dM_t(\omega) \right)^{1/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

► two components

1. improvements in some “average” of the individual productivities
2. gains from variety

## growth with a constant population

- this implies  $\alpha = -\mu/(\sigma^2/2)$  and  $\alpha_* = 0$

– the density near  $b$  is then

$$f(y) = \frac{1 - e^{-\alpha(y-b)}}{\Delta}, \quad y \in [b, b + \Delta]$$

- implied entry and exit rates

$$\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 Df(b) = \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \times \frac{\alpha}{\Delta} = -\frac{\mu}{\Delta} = -\frac{(\epsilon - 1)(\theta_z - \theta)}{\Delta}$$

– this can be written as

$$\theta = \theta_z + \epsilon \times \frac{\Delta}{\epsilon - 1}.$$

► so growth follows from

1. incumbent firms improving their own productivities at the rate  $\theta_z$
2. replacing firms, selectively, with firms that are better

$$z_t[\text{entry}] = z_t[\text{exit}] + \frac{\Delta}{\epsilon - 1}$$

► the entry rate  $\epsilon$  is endogenous

– could enrich the model by making  $\theta_z$  and  $\Delta$  endogenous as well

## randomly copying incumbents

- suppose entrants draw random incumbent and copy productivity
- stationary density must satisfy

$$\eta f(y) = -\mu Df(y) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 D^2 f(y) + \epsilon f(y)$$

together with the boundary conditions

$$f(b) = 0 = \lim_{y \rightarrow \infty} f(y)$$

- solutions of form  $e^{-\alpha y}$  imply

$$\alpha_{\pm} = -\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \pm \sqrt{\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 - \frac{\epsilon - \eta}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

– need  $\epsilon > \eta$  to replace exit at  $b$ , and need real roots

$$\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 \geq \frac{\epsilon - \eta}{\sigma^2/2}$$

– if  $\mu < 0$  then both  $\alpha_+ > \alpha_- > 0$

– not “enough” boundary conditions

- ▶ continuum of stationary densities



## initial conditions matter

- recall

$$\alpha_{\pm} = -\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \pm \sqrt{\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 - \frac{\epsilon - \eta}{\sigma^2/2}}$$

- need real roots

$$\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^2}\right)^2 \geq \frac{\epsilon - \eta}{\sigma^2/2}$$

- when this holds with equality,  $\alpha_+ = \alpha_- = \alpha > 0$ , and

$$f(y) = \alpha^2(y - b)e^{-\alpha(y-b)}$$

- take limit as  $\alpha_+ - \alpha_- \downarrow 0$
- log firm size follows a Gamma density

- ▶ Luttmer [2007] argues this is what will happen when the economy starts with an initial productivity distribution that has bounded support