Lecture 4(i) Announcements
Aplia Experiment Thur or Friday: 3 rounds (around 10 minutes)
If participate, add 1.5 bonus to HW4
Choose between 4 different times:
Thur 9am, 2pm, 10pm
Friday 3pm
(Only participate once!)
Evening Midterm in two weeks! Mon Oct 8 7:00-8:00 pm
If you have conflict, you need to register with headgrader@gmail.com
for makeup Wed 4-5pm
Makeup Registration Deadline (for no penalty) Mon Oct 1, 4pm

Start looking at practice midterm See Canvas, bottom of week 5 !

Lecture

1. Review Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus in Market Allocation

## 2. Pareto Efficiency

3. Link between efficiency and the market allocation.

## Adam Bmity Theorem

After midterm will introduce concept of externalities. Pay attention to news about climate change..
4. Policy 1: Banning Widgets

Last class we figured out what happens when Econland has a market economy

- $\mathrm{Q}=5$
-P = 5
-S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 produce
-D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 consume
Consumer surplus of particular buyer
= reservation price - price paid
Producer surplus of seller
= price received - cost
filled in table to get:

| Q | Res. <br> Price | price <br> paid | CS | Price <br> rec. | Cost | PS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| 4 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| 6 | 4 | - | 0 | - | 6 | 0 |
| 7 | 3 | - | 0 | - | 7 | 0 |
| 8 | 2 | - | 0 | - | 8 | 0 |
| 9 | 1 | - | 0 | - | 9 | 0 |
| 10 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 10 | 0 |
| Total |  | 10 |  |  | 10 |  |

$$
\begin{aligned}
& T S=C S+P S \\
& 20=10+10
\end{aligned}
$$

Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus in Competitive Equilibrium


So that is market allocation
And the social surplus (or "pie") And the division of the surplus ("who get's what slice")

The next step is to examine the efficiency of the market.

Need a concept of efficiency.
The standard concept is
Pareto Efficiency

Vilfredo Pareto 1848-1923


An allocation is Pareto Efficient if it is feasible and there is no way to make someone better off without making someone worse off. or...The Pie is big as it can be. (If someone is to get a bigger slice, it can only come from someone else getting a smaller slice.)

Temporary detour to a simpler economy:

## MoonPieLand



There are 6 pies.
Is the following allocation Pareto efficient?

2 pies to the student, 2 pies to me, and 2 pies in trash

Concept is easy to understand if pies are the only thing in the economy

Pretty simplistic view of the world that there is a fixed pie out there and the only economic question is how the pie is divided up. Somebody has to bake the pie.

Redistribution policies could very well affect how many pies are baked!

This brings us back to Econland. Widgets are NOT scattered about on the ground waiting to be picked up.
They have to be produced.

In Econland there are dollars and widgets. The $S$ people can produce widgets and the D people can consume them. Everyone likes dollars!

The fundamental economic questions that need to be addressed:

- How many widgets should be produced?
- Who should produce widgets?
- Who should consume widgets?
- How many dollars does each person get?

Reservation Prices and Costs for Widgets

| Name | Res. Price | Cost | Name |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| D1 | 9 | 1 | S1 |
| D2 | 8 | 2 | S2 |
| D3 | 7 | 3 | S3 |
| D4 | 6 | 4 | S4 |
| D5 | 5 | 5 | S5 |
| D6 | 4 | 6 | S6 |
| D7 | 3 | 7 | S7 |
| D8 | 2 | 8 | S8 |
| D9 | 1 | 9 | S9 |
| D10 | 0 | 10 | S10 |

The following allocation is not Pareto efficient.

An allocation where D8 consumes a widget but D2 does not

This is not Pareto efficient because..

General Principle 1 Efficient Allocation of Consumption

In any efficient allocation, consumers with highest willingness to pay consume.

Reservation Prices and Costs for Widgets

| Name | Res. Price | Cost | Name |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| D1 | 9 | 1 | S1 |
| D2 | 8 | 2 | S2 |
| D3 | 7 | 3 | S3 |
| D4 | 6 | 4 | S4 |
| D5 | 5 | 5 | S5 |
| D6 | 4 | 6 | S6 |
| D7 | 3 | 7 | S7 |
| D8 | 2 | 8 | S8 |
| D9 | 1 | 9 | S9 |
| D10 | 0 | 10 | S10 |

Next consider an allocation where S7 produces a widget but S3 does not. Is this Pareto efficient?

General Principle 2
Efficient Allocation of Production
In any efficient allocation, producers with the lowest cost produce.

## What about quantity? Let's see what we can learn from the next two examples.

Next consider an allocation where 3 widgets are produced (by S1, S2, S3) and 3 widgets are consumed (by D1, D2, and D3).

Pareto efficient?

Next consider an allocation where 8 widgets are produced (by S1 through S 8 ) and 8 widgets are consumed (by D1 through D8). Let's say S8 is supposed to deliver a widget to D8.

Pareto efficient?
Relative to the initial allocation, S8 can give $\$ 5$ instead of a widget.
-Paying $\$ 5$ is cheaper for S 8 than making a widget.
-D8 would rather have $\$ 5$ than a widget.

- So both better off, no one worse off.

So what do we learn from these last two examples?

## General Principle 3 Efficient Quantity

In any efficient allocation, the quantity is where the marginal valuation of the last unit consumed equals the marginal cost of the last unit produced.

Principles 1, 2, and 3 imply that in an efficient allocation for the widget industry in Econ land:
$\mathrm{Q}=5$
S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 produce
D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 consume

Market Allocation:

$\mathrm{Q}=5, \mathrm{~S} 1, \mathrm{~S} 2, \mathrm{~S} 3, \mathrm{~S} 4, \mathrm{~S} 5$ produce,
D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 consume
Market Allocation is Pareto
Efficient!

Big Idea

## Assume

1. Market structure is perfectly competitive (not monopoly or oligopoly)
2. No externalities (my action hurts or benefits others, but I don't take into account. Like pollution.)

Then the unregulated market (laissez-faire) allocation is Pareto efficient. (It maximizes the size of the social pie.)

## First Welfare Theorem

Adam Smith was on to this. Wealth of Nations, 1776


Every individual... neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting
it...(but)...by directing that industry (to) ...its ... greatest value, he is ...led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention."

The First Welfare Theorem also sometimes called:

Adam Smith Theorem
or
Invisible Hand Theorem

Now while the market maximizes the size of the pie (under the assumptions given above), you might not like the way it is divided up.

Market delivers on efficiency.
Not necessarily on equity.

Policy Analysis 1:
Effect of Banning Widgets
Government ban products sometimes, often claiming issues of safety.

London just announced it is kicking Uber out (though decision is being appealed)
Safety is the store.

Let's look at banning widgets in Econland. Even if safety is an issue with widgets, lets' assume the D people now what they are doing and factor it into their reservation prices.

Start with happens in free market and update:

| Q | Res. Price | price <br> paid | CS | Price rec. | Cost | PS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| 3 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| 4 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| 5 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| 6 | 4 | - | 0 | - | 6 | 0 |
| 7 | 3 | - | 0 | - | 7 | 0 |
| 8 | 2 | - | 0 | - | 8 | 0 |
| 9 | 1 | - | 0 | - | 9 | 0 |
| 10 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 10 | 0 |
|  | tal |  | 10 |  |  | 10 |

TS = CS + PS
$20=10+10$

Free market is a

## Pareto Improvement!

To make analysis more like London, need to introduce the " $T$ " people who make tridgets, that substitute for widgets. The "T" people look like this:


